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Abstract
The DMCA is a decade old, which, in Internet time, may well be closer to a
century. Although the DMCA safe harbors have helped to foster tremendous growth in
web applications in our Web 2.0 world, several very basic aspects of the DMCA safe
harbors remain uncertain. These uncertainties, along with the relative lack of litigation
over the DMCA in the past ten years, have threatened to undermine the whole purpose of
the DMCA safe harbors by failing to inform the public and technology companies of
what steps they need to undertake to fall within the safe harbors. In several high profile
cases against MySpace, YouTube, and other Internet sites, the clarification of the DMCA
safe harbors could prove to be just as important to the Internet as their enactment in 1998.
This Essay has attempted to clear up two of the biggest uncertainties regarding the
DMCA’s relationship to vicarious liability, and the so-called “red flags” theory of
knowledge on the part of the Internet service provider. Specifically, under a proper
interpretation of the DMCA, courts should (i) reject the “loophole” theory that posits that
the DMCA safe harbors provide no immunity from vicarious liability at all, and (ii)
require a high burden for proving a “red flags” theory by requiring knowledge of facts
that show specific and “obvious” or “blatant” infringement. This Essay offers five
principles for courts and Congress to consider in applying or amending the DMCA safe
harbors in the future. The DMCA safe harbors should be made truly “safe” harbors, in a
way that encourages greater investment in and the development of speech technologies
on the Internet, all while encouraging copyright holders to share the burden of reducing
infringement by utilizing the DMCA notice and take-down procedure.
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Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors
Edward Lee *
A decade has passed since Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 (DMCA). This landmark legislation was Congress’s first (but hopefully not
last) attempt to update copyright law to keep pace with the Internet, which, at the time,
was a new technology that made copying and disseminating works around the world
incredibly easy and on a scale before unimaginable. The DMCA added to copyright law
two provisions whose objectives could not be any more different: Title I gives copyright
holders supra-copyright protection against the circumvention of digital rights
management (DRM) on copyrighted works, 1 while Title II establishes four safe harbors
for Internet service providers protecting them from monetary liability under copyright
law. 2 Thus, Title I expanded copyright liability, whereas Title II contracted it.
Today, it is increasingly clear that the safe harbors for ISPs have become the far
more important part of the DMCA, particularly given the abandonment of DRM in the
music industry. 3 Every Internet company in the United States that deals with content of
third-party users—meaning companies such as Amazon, AOL, CNN, eBay, Facebook,
Google, MySpace, YouTube, and numerous Internet startups that want to become just as
big—must adopt and implement a DMCA policy to fall within the safe harbors.
Although websites can forego the DMCA safe harbors without violating copyright law,
as a practical matter virtually all such commercial websites in the U.S. attempt to follow
and fall within the DMCA safe harbors. Indeed, it would be foolish, if not a breach of
corporate fiduciary duty, for any such company not to do so.
Despite the widespread importance of the DMCA safe harbors for Internet
companies, basic aspects of the DMCA safe harbors still remain unclear. Astonishingly,
*

Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Many thanks to
Jonathan Band for comments on an earlier draft, and to Martha Chamallas for feedback on some of the
ideas herein. While I periodically advise technology companies, this Essay was not funded, modified, or
requested by any company during the writing of the Essay.
1
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
2
Id. § 512.
3
Initially, it looked the opposite, with the anti-circumvention provision garnering the greatest
attention among legal commentators. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519
(1999). However, the huge backlash against DRM among consumers—such as encryption on music files
instead of the encryptionless MP3 format—and the growing ambivalence among media companies even to
use DRM have greatly diminished the significance of the anti-circumvention provision, at least in certain
industries. In the music and book industries, fore example, many companies such as iTunes, EMI,
Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, Amazon, Random House, Penguin Group, and Simon &
Schuster have abandoned DRM on audio files. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content,
2008 UNIV. ILL. L.REV. 1459, 1542 & n.405. Apple CEO Steve Jobs led the initiative to get rid of DRM
for music files.
See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, APPLE, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/. In January 2009, Apple, whose iTunes is the market
leader in selling music files, announced the complete abandonment of DRM on music files sold through
iTunes. See Scott Kirsner, Apple’s iTunes Changes May Show Digital Rights Management’s a Loser,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/01/12/
apples_itunes_changes_may_show_digital_rights_managements_a_loser/.
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even the basic question whether the DMCA safe harbors provide any immunity to
vicarious liability is still contested. Mark Lemley suggests that it does not—meaning the
DMCA may have a “gaping loophole” 4 —although other commentators disagree. 5
Unfortunately, the courts have yet to squarely decide the issue, although a few cases have
begun to touch upon the issue in passing and without the clearest of reasoning. 6 Another
basic issue that remains uncertain is the scope of a website’s duty to remove potentially
infringing material beyond the notice-and-takedown procedure specified by the DMCA.
Some copyright holders have argued that Internet companies have more expansive duties
to patrol their sites under the so-called “red flags” theory based on the presence of other
allegedly infringing materials on their sites. The DMCA appears to be ambivalent: it
states that websites have no affirmative duty to monitor their services or to “affirmatively
seek[] facts indicating infringing activity,” 7 while it also imposes a duty to take down
material if the website has “actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing” or
is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” 8 How
these countervailing provisions play out in particular facts has been the source of much
contention.
This Essay attempts to clear up some of the major confusion over the DMCA safe
harbors. Part I attempts to put to rest the “loophole” reading of the DMCA and explains
why the DMCA safe harbors do provide qualified or partial immunity to vicarious
liability (and all other forms of copyright liability as well). The fundamental flaw of the
“loophole” reading is that it mistakenly treats one of the requirements in the DMCA safe
harbor as exactly the same as the standard of vicarious liability, even though the language
in the DMCA is slightly different from—and more restrictive than—the test for vicarious
liability. Part II then analyzes the so-called “red flags” theory and the vexing question of
when an ISP can be said to be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent,” thus giving rise to a duty of take down. Only a few courts have
addressed this issue, but all have rejected the arguments of copyright holders to adopt a
low standard of proving such awareness of infringement. Agreeing with these decisions,
this Essay argues for the adoption of a high standard of proof of specific knowledge of
“blatant” or “obvious” infringement. Part III offers future guidance and principles for
both courts and Congress to help address the pressing need to clarify and update the
DMCA safe harbors as the Internet continues to rapidly evolve.

4

Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 101, 104
& n. 23, 113-14 (2007). See also Rebecca Giblin, A Big Liable? A Guide to Navigating the U.S. Secondary
Liability Patchwork, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7, 44 (2008) (“DMCA safe harbors
provide no protection for vicarious infringement”).
5
See Jonathan Band, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency
Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295 (2002) (“Treating these
tests as the same is extremely dangerous because it invites future courts to apply Napster’s stringent
vicarious liability standards in the DMCA context.”); Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control:
Reading Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1026-28 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber
Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1883 (2000).
6
See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
7
17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
8
Id. § 512(d)(1).
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I.

Do the DMCA Safe Harbors Protect Against Vicarious Liability?

Some ten years after the DMCA was passed, it is hard to believe there is still
debate over whether it provides any immunity to Internet companies from vicarious
liability. By all indications from the legislative history, Congress thought it did. As both
the House and Senate reports state unequivocally: “The limitations in subsections (a)
through (d) protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for
all direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.” 9 However, some commentators
have suggested that the DMCA has a huge loophole that carves out vicarious liability
from the safe harbors entirely, thereby exposing Internet companies to potentially
limitless liability for claims of vicarious infringement. As this Part explains, the
“loophole” theory is wrong. The DMCA provides immunity to Internet companies from
claims of vicarious infringement, as well as direct and contributory infringement claims.
The DMCA safe harbors are not secretly unsafe harbors.
A.

Relevant Text of DMCA Safe Harbors

Section 512 of the Copyright Act contains the DMCA safe harbors. Four basic
safe harbors are set forth in subsections (a) through (d); these provisions immunize
Internet service providers from monetary damages by reason of four different kinds of
conduct: (a) providing Internet access, (b) system caching or temporary storage of
material, (c) passive storage or hosting of material posted by users, and (d) providing
location tools, such as links to content on other sites. 10 (There is also a fifth safe harbor
limited or tailored to higher education institutions. 11 ) The safe harbors protect only
certain activities or functions of Internet service providers—something the DMCA itself
makes clear in section (n). 12 A single website or Internet company can qualify under all
four safe harbors if it engages in all four activities specified in § 512.
The question of potential vicarious liability has arisen in the context of the safe
harbors in subsections (c) and (d). Section 512(c)(1)(B) provides the safe harbor for
Internet service providers for hosting or storing material posted by their users:
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.--

(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
9

S. Rep. 105-190, at 40 (1998) (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998)
(emphasis added).
10
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (b), (c), (d). Subsection (g) also provides immunity under specified
conditions for the Internet service provider’s removal of allegedly infringing material pursuant to a DMCA
notice from the copyright holder. Id. § 512(g).
11
Id. § 512(e).
12
See id. § 512(n) (“Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe separate and distinct functions for
purposes of applying this section.”); S. Rep. 105-190, at 40 (1998) (“New section 512 contains limitations
on service providers’ liability for five general categories of activity set forth in subsections (a) through (d)
and subsection (f)”). In this regard, I think Lemley’s characterization of the DMCA safe harbors as
protecting “classes of intermediaries” is not exactly right. See Lemley, supra note [], at 104 (DMCA
protects “only four classes of intermediaries”).
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infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider, if the service provider—l
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove,
or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.

The same language that is italicized above can be found also in § 512(d)(2), which sets
forth the requirements for the safe harbor for activity involving location tools. 13 Thus, a
prerequisite for both the storage and location tool safe harbors is that the ISP “does not
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”
B.

Decoding the “Loophole” Theory of the DMCA Safe Harbors
1.

The “Loophole” Reading

The above italicized language is the sole basis for the “loophole” theory, and the
confusion over whether the DMCA safe harbors, albeit inadvertently, left open a “gaping
loophole” by which many Internet companies can potentially be subject to millions of
dollars in copyright liability for vicarious infringement. 14 The putative loophole exists
because Internet companies cannot fall within the DMCA safe harbors if they “receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity,” which some
commentators have equated as the exact same standard as vicarious liability. If correct,
the loophole interpretation of the DMCA may, as Lemley recognizes, “undo the benefits
of the safe harbors altogether,” given how easy it is to allege vicarious infringement
against Internet companies under the case law. 15
13

17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2).
Lemley, supra note 4, at 114.
15
Id. The Goldstein copyright treatise appears to provide some support for Lemley’s view, although
the reference in the Goldstein treatise is very brief and does not explicitly go as far as Lemley’s assertion.
See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.3.2, at 8:42 (3d ed. 2007) (“The second condition
for this safe harbor effectively embodies the rules on vicarious liability, and requires that the service
14
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Although Lemley recently suggested the loophole theory, it is unclear whether he
himself thinks it is the correct interpretation of the DMCA. Lemley’s essay, which
focused on a different topic, 16 contains only two sentences floating the theory. 17 The
actual support for his theory is contained in footnote 23, which is worth quoting in full:
Id. § 512(c)(1)(B) (safe harbor available only to an intermediary that “does not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”). The language suggests
that it provides a safe harbor under section 512(c) only against claims of direct and
contributory infringement, rather than vicarious liability. The legislative history suggests
the opposite. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998)(suggesting—wrongly—that
the bill would “protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief
for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement”). And the fact that the statute doesn’t
use the term vicarious infringement, but instead sets out what were commonly understood
in 1998 to be the elements of a vicarious infringement claim, raises additional questions.
The Ninth Circuit has steadily whittled away the requirement of “direct financial benefit”
as a requirement for vicarious infringement, for instance, to the point where it has held
parties liable in the absence of any financial benefit at all, direct or indirect. See A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (beginning the whittling away of the “direct
financial benefit” requirement completed in Napster). And the Supreme Court has created
a new tort for inducement of copyright infringement, though it claimed that this new tort
was an offshoot of contributory infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Are these new or broadened torts also outside the
safe harbor? A plain reading of the statute would suggest not, but to date there is no case
law on the issue. 18

Though Lemley may be equivocal on his view of the correct interpretation, I use his
essay as a springboard for examining the “loophole” theory because I believe Lemley
encapsulates well the theory.
2.

Relevant case law

Courts have yet to tease out the relationship between vicarious liability and the
DMCA safe harbors. Although several courts have discussed different aspects of the
issue, the courts have yet to fully explain the precise relationship—I think, in part,
provider ‘not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”). The Nimmer treatise, however, takes a
contrary view and suggests that the DMCA safe harbor only excludes from immunity a more limited set of
vicarious liability cases instead of the more expansive, common-law views of vicarious liability in which
courts effectively stretched the requirement of “direct financial benefit” to include indirect benefits as well.
See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[A]{2][b], at 12B-55 –
12B-56 (2008).
16
Lemley’s essay was meant to provide a panoramic view of several different safe harbors,
including the DMCA, and to offer a single, common approach to Internet safe harbors. Lemley, supra note
4, at 101-02. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to discuss the merits of Lemley’s very interesting
proposal. I focus instead on his suggestion that the DMCA safe harbors do not work against vicarious
liability, but I do not want to make more out of Lemley’s suggestion than he intended.
17
Id. at 104, 114-15.
18
Id. at 104 n.23.
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because the DMCA itself is not a model of clarity. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
produced the most relevant case law; each is discussed in turn.
a.

Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit’s case law cuts against the loophole interpretation. In dictum,
the district court in Costar appeared to adopt something close to the loophole position,
stating that “[b]asically, the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement
because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability.” 19 We should not read too much
into this statement, however. The dictum was qualified by the district court’s own
analysis, which required a fairly strict showing that defendant received a financial benefit
“directly attributable to the infringing activity.” 20 That strict standard was not satisfied
where the users of defendant’s real estate website made no payments of any kind to the
defendant. 21 The district court even rejected the argument that “enhanc[ing] the
attractiveness of the venue to potential customers”—something that could easily be
considered a financial benefit under vicarious liability case law—constituted the kind of
disqualifying financial benefit that fell outside the DMCA. 22 In the court’s view, such a
benefit was only an indirect benefit. 23
The Nimmer treatise believes the district court’s opinion in Costar correctly
applied a stricter standard for “a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity” than courts have applied rather loosely in vicarious liability cases for the direct
financial benefit prong. According to the Nimmer treatise:
In the context of this safe harbor, Judge Chasanow in Costar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc
took the requirement of “direct financial benefit” literally. That construction stands in
contrast to the gloss on “direct financial benefit,” an element of vicarious liability as
defined at common law—in which courts are so non-literal as to be willing to construe
past judicial references to “direct” as meaning, essentially, “indirect.” But whereas those
courts were spinning out interpretation of a common law standard, and thereby enjoyed
the authority to construct new interpretation consonant with their sense of justice,
presumably much less latitude applies to the task of construing the language that
Congress employed in a statute. 24

However one reads the district court’s opinion, the court’s dictum suggesting that
vicarious liability falls outside the DMCA safe harbor was later rejected by the Fourth
Circuit, which held that the DMCA safe harbors apply to both vicarious and contributory
infringement:

19

Costar Group Inc., v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 373 F.3d 544
(4th Cir. 2004).
20
Id. at 705.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15, at 12B-55 – 12B-56.
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An ISP, however, can become liable indirectly upon a showing of additional involvement
sufficient to establish a contributory or vicarious violation of the Act. In that case, the ISP
could still look to the DMCA for a safe harbor if it fulfilled the conditions therein. 25

Although the court did not discuss the relationship between the DMCA and vicarious
liability at length, it did characterize § 512(c)(1)(B) as requiring that the defendant “does
not profit directly from the violation” 26 —an interpretation that is close to the one I
advance later in this Essay.
b.

Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit’s case law is a little bit more mixed. Giving some support to
the “loophole” reading, the case law does suggest that the DMCA codifies the same
standard of “direct financial benefit” as the common law standard for vicarious liability.
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC:
Based on the “well-established rule of construction that where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under common law, a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of
these terms,” Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 21, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)), we hold that “direct
financial benefit” should be interpreted consistent with the similarly-worded common law
standard for vicarious copyright liability. See, e.g., Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078 (a
vicariously liable copyright infringer “derive[s] a direct financial benefit from the
infringement and ha[s] the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity”). Thus,
the relevant inquiry is “whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers,
not just an added benefit.” Id. at 1079. In Ellison, the court held that “no jury could
reasonably conclude that AOL received a direct financial benefit from providing access
to the infringing material” because “[t]he record lacks evidence that AOL attracted or
retained subscriptions because of the infringement or lost subscriptions because of AOL’s
eventual obstruction of the infringement.” Id. 27

Yet, in practice, the Ninth Circuit appears to have applied the DMCA safe harbor in a
way to require a fairly high level of proof for direct financial benefit, perhaps higher than
the common law standard. In CCBill, the Ninth Circuit went on to rely on the examples
in the legislative history that “receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat, periodic payments
for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving
a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.’” 28
It is difficult to discern how far the Ninth Circuit meant to go in holding that
“‘direct financial benefit’ should be interpreted consistent with the similarly-worded
common law standard for vicarious copyright liability.”29 For various reasons, I do not
believe we can take it as an endorsement of the “loophole” reading of the DMCA.
25
26
27
28
29

CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 552.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1118 (quoting H.R. Rep. 105-551 (II), at 54 (1998)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1117.
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First of all, the court never went as far as to hold that all vicarious liability claims
fall outside of the DMCA safe harbor. As I discuss later below, most courts have
interpreted another part of the DMCA safe harbor—i.e., the “right and ability to control
such activity”—in a way that is more narrow than the analogous standard under vicarious
liability. 30
Second, as the CCBill case suggests, the Ninth Circuit’s more recent case law
may be tightening the requirements of proof for vicarious liability compared to the looser
“direct financial interest” approach of the common law, in order to match it with the
stricter standard of the DMCA. In essence, the DMCA standard might be having a
reverse effect on vicarious liability law, effectively tightening the requirements of proof
there. For example, Ellison v. Robertson, 31 the case cited in CCBill, applied a fairly strict
standard of “direct financial benefit” under vicarious liability. The case involved the
unauthorized postings of Harlan Ellison’s works by a third party onto a USENET news
group accessible on AOL to its users (who paid for AOL service). 32 The court held that
the plaintiff failed to establish a triable vicarious infringement claim against AOL
because there was no evidence to establish a causal connection “between AOL’s profits
from subscriptions and the infringing activity taking place on its USENET servers.” 33
The court found no evidence that “AOL attracted or retained [paid] subscriptions because
of infringement.” 34
In short, the cases from the Ninth Circuit are still evolving. None has squarely
decided whether the DMCA safe harbors provide no immunity from any vicarious
liability claim.
C.

Why the “Loophole” Theory Is Wrong

The “loophole” theory of the DMCA safe harbor rests on the similarity in
language between the DMCA’s requirement that the ISP “does not receive a financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service
provider has the right and ability to control such activity,” and the requirements of
vicarious liability. This similarity, however, is too slender a reed on which to base a
“gaping loophole” to the DMCA.
1.

The text of the DMCA is not exactly the same as traditional
vicarious liability standards

First things first: the text. The plain language of the DMCA is not the same as
the standard of vicarious liability. The loophole interpretation erroneously concludes that
the language in the DMCA safe harbor—“does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right
30
31
32
33
34

See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1079.
Id.

9

and ability to control such activity”—is the same as the language for the traditional
standard of vicarious liability. 35 Not so.
Indeed, no court has ever used the exact same language of the DMCA to describe
the standard of vicarious liability under copyright law. Although similar, the traditional
standard of vicarious liability is that secondary liability will attach “if [the defendant] has
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial
interest in such activities.” 36
True, the requirement regarding the defendant’s “right and ability” to control or
supervise the infringing activity appears to be very similar to, if not the same as, the
DMCA wording. But the words of the DMCA’s “financial” requirement are different
than the copyright standard of vicarious liability and appear to be stricter. In the DMCA,
the defendant must “not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity.” By contrast, under the traditional standard for vicarious liability, the defendant
must not have “a direct financial interest in such activities,” 37 or, in other cases, obtain a
“direct financial benefit from the infringement.” 38
Although similar to the common law standard, the DMCA wording is not the
same. Indeed, the phrasing in the DMCA—“receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity”—has never been used before by any federal court
to describe the standard for vicarious liability. Nor has it ever been used by any state
court in any case in any area of law. The phrasing is Congress’s own creation.
There are at least two key differences in Congress’s wording. First, the DMCA
speaks of “receive” a financial “benefit.” That appears to require something more than
just “having” a financial “interest,” the standard mentioned in some of the seminal
vicarious liability classes. For example, I might own 100,000 shares in a startup
company that has yet to begin its business, has earned no revenue at all, and whose shares
are nontransferable and worth virtually nothing. Clearly, I “have” a financial “interest”
in the startup company, but, under the ordinary meaning of the terms, I would be hard
pressed to say that I have actually “received” a financial “benefit” yet from shares that
are worth nothing.

35

This same mistake is made even by some commentators who argue against the “loophole” reading.
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 5, at 1007 (“This language tracks the test for vicarious liability for copyright
infringement. Because a vicariously liable service provider by definition has control and receives a direct
financial benefit, the plain language of this bar makes the safe harbor unavailable to any service provider
that has already been found vicariously liable.”).
36
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Arts Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (1971); see also
Shapiro, Bernstein Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (same); CoStar Group, Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004); Gordon v. Nextel Commcns. & Mullen Advertising, 345
F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir.
1988) (same); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).
37
See, e.g., Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Costar, 373 F.3d at 550.
38
See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The second key difference is that the DMCA has the language “directly
attributable to infringing activity,” a locution that no case in copyright law has ever used
to describe vicarious liability. Although similar to the vicarious liability standard, the
phrasing chosen by Congress is different and appears to require a greater level of
attribution or causation. The financial benefit must be “directly attributable” to the
infringing activity.
Given the difference in wording between the DMCA’s requirement of “a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” and the common law
vicarious liability standard of “a direct financial interest (or benefit) in such activities,”
the canon of construction that presumes Congress intends to incorporate “the
accumulated settled meaning under the common law” simply does not apply. 39 That was
one of the mistakes of the Ninth Circuit in the CCBill case. 40 In copyright law’s
treatment of vicarious liability, no meaning, settled or otherwise, even exists for the term
“financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” That term of art exists
only in the statute, not in the common law. Under Supreme Court precedents, the canon
of common law meaning applies only to statutory terms that are identical with the
common law. 41 However, mere similarity to a common-law doctrine is not a basis for
applying the canon, particularly where, as here, the statutory terms are worded differently
than the common law. 42
39

Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms”).
40
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007).
41
See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (interpreting “defraud” in federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
statutes); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (interpreting “employee” in
ERISA); Evans v. U.S., 504 U.S. 255, 261-64 (1992) (interpreting “extortion” in 18 U.S.C. § 1951);
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989) (interpreting “employee” and
“scope of employment” in Copyright Act); Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (interpreting
“restraint of trade” under Antitrust Act).
42
See Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 255, 264 (2000) (“While we (and the Government) agree that the
statutory crimes at issue here bear a close resemblance to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny,
that observation is beside the point. The canon on imputing common-law meaning applies only when
Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning at common law….”) (internal citations
omitted); id. at 265 (a “cluster of ideas” from the common law should be imported into statutory text only
when Congress employs a common-law term, and not when, as here, Congress simply describes an offense
analogous to a common-law crime without using common-law terms); Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246,
263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and
meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to
the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as
satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”) (emphasis added).
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted statutory terms, though similar to
common law concepts, as different from the common law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 492 n.10
(1997) (interpreting federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1014, making it a crime to knowingly make “false
statement” to FDIC insured bank so as not to require proof of materiality required in common law crimes
involving false statements such as perjury); Perrin v. U.S., 444 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1979) (Travel Act
prohibition against travel or use of facility in interstate commerce to commit “bribery” in violation of state
laws had more expansive notion of bribery than common law); U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411-12
(1957) (refusing to apply common law canon to “stolen” in National Motor Vehicle Theft Act so as to limit
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2.

Congress knew how to expressly exclude vicarious liability in the
DMCA, but chose not to in the DMCA safe harbors

The structure of the DMCA safe harbors also militates against the “loophole”
reading. If Congress’s intent were to carve out vicarious liability from the DMCA safe
harbors, it could have simply stated that “Nothing in this section diminishes or
immunizes claims of vicarious liability against Internet service providers.” Period, end of
debate.
Indeed, in the very same statute dealing with the DMCA anti-circumvention
provision (Title I of the Act), Congress did exactly that for an unrelated section dealing
with the anti-circumvention provision, which clearly states: “Nothing in this section shall
enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in
connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.” 43
For the DMCA safe harbors, however, Congress did not include any such
provision exempting vicarious liability. One could argue that Congress meant to do the
same thing through the words “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity.” But that suggestion would mean that Congress chose to include an
express exclusion of vicarious liability in Title I of the DMCA, but then a different, more
convoluted and roundabout exclusion of vicarious liability in Title II of the DMCA.
Such a proposition is unconvincing. As the Supreme Court has recognized, it is
doubtful that Congress would adopt an indirect, convoluted wording to achieve the same
result as what Congress has achieved expressly by clear wording in a statute, 44 especially
where, as here, it is the very same statute containing the provisions in question, all
enacted at the very same time. 45 There is no explanation for why Congress would
it to common law larceny because “stolen” “has no accepted common-law meaning” and is not a “word of
art”).
43
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) (emphasis added).
44
See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (“[w]hen
Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so”); Howard Delivery
Serv., Inc. v. Zurich American Ins., 547 U.S. 651, 676 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Congress wanted
a particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code to narrow the ordinary definition to exclude mandatory
workers’ compensation, it did so expressly by referring to those plans covered by ERISA”); United States
v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 172 (1991) (“When Congress wanted to limit the scope of immunity available
under the Liability Reform Act, it did so expressly, as it did in preserving employee liability for Bivens
actions and for actions brought under a federal statute authorizing recovery against the individual
employee.”); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988) (“Where
Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method of state-law enforcement of judgments, or
extend anti-alienation protection to a particular type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly in the statute.”); see
also United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“we doubt that Congress would
choose to exercise such an unusual power implicitly, in such a roundabout fashion, and for an offense
which does not partake of the nature of mala in se. After all, on the one occasion Congress actually
intended to eliminate a statute of limitations, it did so explicitly.”);
45
See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222 (1986) (“Section 4 indicates that
when Congress wanted to preserve the right to recover under the law of another sovereign for whatever
measure of damages that law might provide, regardless of any inconsistency with the measure of damages
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expressly exclude vicarious liability in the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA
(Title I of the Act), but then adopt a much more convoluted, roundabout way of doing the
exact same thing in the DMCA safe harbors (Title II of the Act). Lemley does appear to
find it puzzling why Congress would not just refer to vicarious infringement by name in
the DMCA safe harbors; as Lemley concedes, “the fact that the statute doesn’t use the
term vicarious infringement, but instead sets out what were commonly understood in
1998 to be the elements of a vicarious infringement claim, raises additional questions.” 46
3.

The DMCA’s purpose and legislative history refute the loophole
theory

Both the Senate and the House Reports indicate that Congress wanted to provide a
safe harbor from all monetary relief under copyright law, whatever the cause of action.
The Reports state:
The limitations in subsections (a) through (d) protect qualifying service providers
from liability for all monetary relief for all direct, vicarious and contributory
infringement. 47
And specifically with respect to the safe harbor in subsection (c) for storage of material,
the Reports state:
Subsection (c) limits liability of qualifying service providers for claims of direct,
vicarious and contributory infringement for storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider. 48
Moreover, the whole purpose of the DMCA safe harbors was to “provide certainty for
copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to copyright infringement
liability online.” 49
The loophole theory would completely undermine that purpose. Other than the
inadvertent “loophole” theory, there is no explanation for why Congress might have
wanted such a gaping loophole in the DMCA safe harbors as a policy matter. There is
simply no basis in either the statute or the legislative history to conclude that Congress
felt that vicarious infringement was somehow worse than contributory infringement to
provided by DOHSA, it did so expressly. We are reluctant to read the much more ambiguous language of §
7, which states only that state law ‘remedies’ or ‘rights of action’ would not be ‘affected’ and which makes
no provision for reconciling potentially conflicting state and federal measures of recovery, to have the same
substantive effect as the explicit command of § 4.”); Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”)

(quoting U.S. v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
Lemley, supra note 4, at 104 n.23.
47
S. Rep. 105-190, at 40 (1998) (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 50 (1998)
(emphasis added).
48
S. Rep. 105-190, at 43 (emphasis added); see H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 53.
49
S. Rep. 105-190, at 2; H.R. Rep. 105-551(II), at 49-50.
46
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justify including the latter, but not the former, within the safe harbor. Instead, the
“loophole” reading rests on the shaky premise that Congress effectively goofed up in
drafting a bill that both the House and Senate committee reports thought would provide
immunity to vicarious liability. While it is true that Congress sometimes errs in drafting
legislation, one should not jump to such a conclusion when an alternative, reasonable
interpretation exists. 50
4.

The “loophole” interpretation shifts the burden of proving
vicarious liability to the defendant

Another oddity produced by the “loophole” interpretation of the DMCA is that it
would effectively shift the burden of proof for vicarious liability claims to the defendant
whenever the DMCA safe harbors under subsections (c) and (d) are invoked. The
DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses that must be proven by the defendant; often,
the defense is invoked on summary judgment without any determination on proof of
liability because the safe harbor can dispose of the case. 51 So under the “loophole”
theory, the plaintiff would not have to prove vicarious liability; instead, the ISP would
have to prove a negative, namely, that it did not commit vicarious liability.
Although Congress has the power to shift the traditional burden of proof in
copyright cases, it is hard to imagine that Congress would have done so by choosing such
an indirect, convoluted way. In an analogous situation, in interpreting the fair use
defense in trademark cases, the Supreme Court rejected a similar interpretation of the
Lanham Act that would have shifted the burden of proof on likelihood of confusion—a
core element of trademark claims—to the defendant whenever fair use was invoked. 52
The Court’s analysis on this point is particularly instructive:
Finally, a look at the typical course of litigation in an infringement action points up the
incoherence of placing a burden to show nonconfusion on a defendant. If a plaintiff
succeeds in making out a prima facie case of trademark infringement, including the
element of likelihood of consumer confusion, the defendant may offer rebutting evidence
to undercut the force of the plaintiff’s evidence on this (or any) element, or raise an
affirmative defense to bar relief even if the prima facie case is sound, or do both. But it
would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of showing affirmatively that the
plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some element (like confusion); all the defendant
needs to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its own
burden on that point. A defendant has no need of a court’s true belief when agnosticism
50

See generally Unites States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (avoid interpretations that “lead
to internal inconsistencies, an absurd result, or an interpretation inconsistent with the intent of Congress”);
see also City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing “rule that a statute should not be interpreted to produce absurd results”); U.S. v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing “scrivener’s error” doctrine
and application to statutes where “meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed”); Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 (1989).
51
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2008 WL 5423841, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (“affirmative defense under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s … ‘safe
harbor’ provisions”).
52
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 549 U.S. 111, 119-20 (2004).
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will do. Put another way, it is only when a plaintiff has shown likely confusion by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant could have any need of an affirmative
defense, but under Lasting’s theory the defense would be foreclosed in such a case. “[I]t
defies logic to argue that a defense may not be asserted in the only situation where it even
becomes relevant.” Nor would it make sense to provide an affirmative defense of no
confusion plus good faith, when merely rebutting the plaintiff’s case on confusion would
entitle the defendant to judgment, good faith or not. 53

The same criticism applies to “loophole” reading of the DMCA safe harbors. It is
highly doubtful that Congress, in a “fit of terse drafting,” meant to shift the burden of
proof of vicarious liability in the DMCA safe harbors by oblique, roundabout language. 54
The legislative history indicates the exact opposite. 55
D.

The Proper Interpretation: The DMCA Safe Harbors Provide Partial
Immunity from Some, but Not All, Vicarious Infringement Claims

What then is the proper understanding of the DMCA’s language “does not receive
a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”?
1.

The DMCA’s partial immunity from vicarious infringement

As explained above, the text of the DMCA is different from the common law
standard of vicarious liability. Accordingly, the DMCA should not be interpreted to be
the same as the common law standard. The term “receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity” requires a closer causal connection between the
infringing activity and the ISP’s actual receipt of a financial benefit. It must be “directly
attributable” to the infringing activity, which is a higher level of proof and causation than
required under the common law.
In other words, Congress intended to disqualify some, but not all, forms of
vicarious infringement—namely, the more egregious kinds—from the DMCA safe
harbors. Although Congress did not describe the safe harbors in this way, I shall call this
interpretation a qualified immunity or partial immunity reading of the DMCA. It is
qualified in two senses: (i) ISPs have to qualify for the safe harbor by meeting certain
requirements specified in the statute, and (ii) some forms of vicarious infringement (and
also contributory infringement) are given immunity, while others (the more egregious
forms) are not. 56 If the vicarious infringement resulted in the ISP “receiv[ing] a financial
53

Id. at 120 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 118.
55
See H.R. Rep. 105-551(I), at 26 (“While the burden of proving the elements of direct or
contributory infringement, or vicarious liability, rests with the copyright owner in a suit brought for
copyright infringement, a defendant asserting this exemption or limitation as an affirmative defense in such
a suit bears the burden of establishing its entitlement.”).
56
Qualified immunity is best known as a doctrine for government officials who violate federal
constitutional rights; such officials receive immunity if they did not violate “clearly established law” at the
time of the violation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). I do not mean to suggest that
Congress considered the qualified immunity doctrine from constitutional law as a basis for drafting the
54
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benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,” and if the ISP “has the right and
ability to control such activity,” the DMCA safe harbors do not apply to immunize the
ISP.
In essence, Congress chose to require proof of both (i) a closer causal
connection—“directly attributable”—between the ISP’s alleged financial benefit and the
third-party’s infringing activity and (ii) a greater level of actualized financial benefit or
gains that are actually “receive[d]” by the ISP as a direct result of the infringement. I
would characterize these circumstances as requiring evidence that the ISP actually
received “ill-gotten gains” directly from the infringing activity of third parties, to borrow
the lingo from unjust enrichment. In such case, immunity from monetary damages under
the DMCA safe harbor would make little sense, since the ISP would have directly
profited financially from infringing activity in a manner that is easy to trace back to the
infringement. The ISP should not be able to profit from its ill-gotten gains.
This reading is supported by consideration of other federal statutes or laws in
which “directly attributable” is used. In other areas of law, the language “directly
attributable” is often used to describe a direct causal connection between certain conduct
and resulting revenues or damages. 57 For example, the Age Discrimination Employment
Act (ADEA) allows the court to award a prevailing plaintiff “attorney’s fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
2000e-2(m) of this title.” 58 Likewise in § 1983 claims, a municipality can be held liable
for an officer’s conduct that violates constitutional rights only if the conduct is “directly
attributable to the city’s policy or custom.” 59 A “direct attribution” requirement is often
used to signal a greater causal connection before recovery of damages is allowed.
In the Copyright Act, the basic damages provision allows for recovery of “any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages,” under a burden-shifting scheme in which the
plaintiff must offer proof of the infringer’s gross revenue, and then the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove “her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work.” 60 The use of “directly” attributable in the
DMCA safe harbor arguably implies an even greater showing of causation in the safe
harbor than required under the basic damages provision for a copyright claim. Requiring
proof of direct attribution for damages effectively serves as a way to limit the scope of
DMCA. Instead, I draw this analogy to a well-known kind of immunity, in order to illuminate how I
believe the DMCA safe harbors operate in an analogous manner as a form of partial immunity to ISPs. To
draw the analogy to constitutional law, officials are immunized from suits for violations of constitutional
rights, but not the most egregious violations when they violated “clearly established law.”
57
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.6 (1994) (state prisoner may not bring § 1983
claim “if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,” such
as where he “seek[s] damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement”); U.S. v. ASCAP, No.
Civ.A. 41-1395 (WCC), 2008 WL 1967722, at*56 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2008) (revenue “directly
attributable” to different types of music uses online).
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
59
Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2008); see Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d
567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
60
17 U.S.C. § 504 (emphasis added).
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liability to what damages the plaintiff has actually proven to have directly resulted from
the illegal or tortious conduct, instead of indirect damages or speculative theories of
resulting damages. 61
2.

Structural analysis

Other parts of the DMCA safe harbors support my interpretation. First, courts
have interpreted the DMCA’s requirement of a “right and ability to control such
[infringing activity]” in subsections (c) and (d) in a more limited or restrictive way than
the common law standard under vicarious liability. Second, the DMCA safe harbors in
subsections (c) and (d) also provide partial or qualified immunity from contributory
infringement claims. Thus, because both of these requirements are contained in the same
subsections, the other requirement of subsections (c) and (d) at issue here—“receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity”—should be read
consistently with these two other requirements as recognizing a form of partial or
qualified immunity under the safe harbor.
i.

DMCA standard of “right and ability to control such
activity” has been interpreted more narrowly than
vicarious liability standard

The DMCA safe harbor establishes a qualified immunity to vicarious liability in
the other part of § 512(c)(1)(B)—the limitation that the financial benefit arise “in a case
in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”62 If the
service provider maintains no such right or ability, the whole financial benefit prong
simply drops out of the picture for the DMCA safe harbor. Even though the similarity of
language between this section and the common law standard of vicarious liability is even
closer here than in the financial benefit prong of § 512(c)(1)(B), courts have already
interpreted the DMCA standard of “right and ability to control such activity” in a more
restrictive manner than its vicarious liability counterpart.
Specifically, a website’s ability to remove materials posted by third parties does
not satisfy the “right and ability to control” under the DMCA safe harbors because such
power is necessary for a website to satisfy the basic requirement of “takedown” under the
DMCA. 63 The leading case is Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., in which the district court
explained the reasons for interpreting the DMCA more narrowly:
61

See, e.g., Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. BCI Holdings, 444 F. Supp. 2d 423, 430-31 (D.
Md. 2006) (“the litigation of BCI’s RICO claims would involve precisely the kind of unmanageable
litigation and proof problems the Anza court meant to prevent. It would be extremely difficult to calculate
how much of BCI’s lost profits might be directly attributable to the scheme rather than to a host of other
reasons, compared to the relative ease of determining whatever amount of money Performax and NAHP
unlawfully withheld from their customers”).
62
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
63
See Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“The ‘right and ability to
control’ infringing activity, as the concept is used in the DMCA, has been held to mean ‘something more’
than just the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or
stored in its system.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Costar, 164 F.
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First, the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, as the concept is used in the
DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to remove or block access to
materials posted on its website or stored in its system. To hold otherwise would defeat the
purpose of the DMCA and render the statute internally inconsistent. The DMCA
specifically requires a service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on
its system when it receives notice of claimed infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §§
512(c)(1)(C). The DMCA also provides that the limitations on liability only apply to a
service provider that has “adopted and reasonably implemented ... a policy that provides
for the termination in appropriate circumstances of [users] of the service provider’s
system or network who are repeat infringers.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). Congress could
not have intended for courts to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe
harbor provision of the DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by
the DMCA. 64

Other courts that have considered the issue have all agreed with the Hendrickson court’s
analysis. 65
The Hendrickson approach departs from the common law. How so? Traditional
vicarious liability cases might well find that a website’s ability to terminate its users’
accounts and remove any user content the website finds inappropriate satisfies the “right
and ability to control” requirement of vicarious liability.
For example, in the seminal case of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Green Co., the
court found that a department store’s contractual ability to supervise the conduct of an
independent contractor who sold records within its store was enough to constitute “right
and ability to supervise” for vicarious liability. 66 The court believed that its ruling would
“simply encourage” the store to police the independent contractor as the store had the
power to do. 67 The traditional “dance hall” cases in which vicarious liability has been
found present an even more expansive view—in these cases, the dance hall might not
even have any control over the selection of music played, but still be found vicariously
liable. 68 Under this well-established case law, every website on the Internet that hosts
material of third parties would be deemed to have the “right and ability to control” under
the DMCA. That also might be the result under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Fonovisa
and Napster, both of which found a right and ability to control infringing activity based

Supp. 2d at 704, aff’d on other grounds, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see also Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (recognizing Amazon qualified for DMCA safe harbor giving immunity from vicarious
infringement).
64
Hendrickson, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
65
See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., -- F. Supp. 2d -- , 2008 WL 4065872, at *16
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008); Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV 06-4436 FMC, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. June 20, 2007); Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 118182; Costar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
66
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).

18

on the respective defendant’s contractual and actual ability to police its site and facilities
for infringement. 69
However, the courts have rejected this approach to “right and ability to control”
the third-party infringing activity under the DMCA. This growing line of case law might
be characterized as requiring that that ISP have a level of direct control over the specific
third-party activity in question—e.g., serving as an editor of content—that is greater than
the ISP’s general technological control over its website and its contractual ability to
terminate accounts in a user agreement.
ii.

DMCA safe harbors establish partial immunity from
contributory infringement

My interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B)’s relationship to vicarious liability is also
supported by a structural analysis of the remaining parts of subsection (c). Subsection
(c)(1)(A) deals with contributory infringement, especially the knowledge element, and
effectively acts in a parallel manner to provide immunity from some, but not all, forms of
contributory infringement. 70 For example, under traditional standards of copyright law,
contributory infringement would be easily established if an ISP provided the “site and
facilities” for third-party infringement on a website that stored third-party materials and
knew that its users were engaging in infringing activity. 71 However, the DMCA provides
immunity to the ISP if, upon obtaining such knowledge, it “acts expeditiously to remove,
or disable access to, the material” that is infringing. 72 This is a form of qualified
immunity because the ISP would not fall within the safe harbor if it acted too slowly or
did nothing at all. The DMCA thus immunizes the ISP from some, but not all, forms of
contributory infringement.
3.

Legislative History

Legislative history confirms my reading. In several passages, both the Senate and
the House Committees analyzed the “receive a financial benefit directly attributable”
language. Yet nowhere did the committee reports ever suggest that Congress meant to
codify a common law standard. Instead, the reports indicate the opposite.
At the outset of the Senate Report, the Judiciary Committee expressed a clear
intention to avoid analyzing the “evolving” case law of secondary liability, stating:
There have been several cases relevant to service provider liability for copyright
infringement. Most have approached the issue from the standpoint of contributory and
69

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster … has
the ability to locate infringing material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access
to the system.”); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Cherry Auction
had the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that right had the ability to
control the activities of vendors on the premises.”).
70
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
71
See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
72
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).

19

vicarious liability. Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of these
doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead,
to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service providers. A
service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit if limited
liability. 73

Later, the Senate Report indicates that “Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service
provider is or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation
of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify.” 74 These statements are significant for
two reasons. First, the Judiciary Committee recognized that the case law regarding
vicarious and contributory infringement against ISPs was still “evolving.” As such, the
case law may have been perceived as a moving target, and perhaps in need of
“clarification.” Second, the Committee chose not to meddle with the “evolving”
standards of secondary liability in copyright law, but instead to create the DMCA safe
harbors. It is quite clear that the Judiciary Committee thought the DMCA safe harbors
and secondary liability should be treated as two separate issues. Given this legislative
history, the loophole reading becomes even more dubious. By all indications, the
Committee did not view the DMCA safe harbors as somehow dependent on the
“evolving” standards of secondary liability. If anything, these statements suggest the
exact opposite—instead of adopting the “evolving” standards of vicarious liability that it
decided to “leave” aside, Congress chose to create safe harbors separate from those
standards. 75
The Senate Report later takes a view of “directly attributable” that is more
restrictive than how courts have understand the “financial benefit” prong under vicarious
liability:
Subsection (c)(1)(B) sets forth the circumstances under which a service provider would
lose the protection of subsection (c) by virtue of its benefit from and control over
infringing activity. In determining whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied,
courts should take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one. In
general, a service provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to
receive a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the
infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s
service. Thus, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service from
a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving a “financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.” Nor is subparagraph (B) intended
to cover fees based on the length of the message (per number of bytes, for example) or by
connect time. It would however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies
in providing access to infringing material. 76

In these examples, the Senate required a specific showing that any fees gained were
directly tied to infringing activity. This is a fairly high level of attribution.
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Like the Senate Committee, the House Committee on the Judiciary also viewed
the case law on secondary liability as “evolving.” But the House Committee took a more
express view on how the DMCA safe harbors change existing case law by making it
“somewhat more difficult to satisfy” the liability standards by creating safe harbors.
Title II of this bill codifies the core of current case law dealing with the liability of online service providers, while narrowing and clarifying the law in other respects. It offers
the advantage of incorporating and building on those judicial applications of existing
copyright law to the digital environment that have been widely accepted as fair and
reasonable. * * *
As to direct infringement, liability is ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged in
through a technological process initiated by another. Thus, the bill essentially codifies the
result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date: Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995). In doing so, it overrules those aspects of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993), insofar as that case suggests that such acts by service
providers could constitute direct infringement, and provides certainty that Netcom and its
progeny, so far only a few district court cases, will be the law of the land.
As to secondary liability, the bill changes existing law in two primary respects: (1) no
monetary relief can be assessed for the passive, automatic acts identified in Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc.; and (2) the
current criteria for finding contributory infringement or vicarious liability are made
clearer and somewhat more difficult to satisfy. 77

In the last sentence, the House Report clearly indicates an intent to treat the DMCA safe
harbors differently than the common law standards of secondary liability. Thus, to the
extent Congress borrowed common-law concepts of secondary liability, they are
“somewhat more difficult to satisfy” under the DMCA. If that statement were not clear
enough, the House Report goes on to state: “[T]he provision modifies and clarifies the
knowledge element of contributory infringement and the financial benefit element of
vicarious liability. Even if a provider satisfies the common-law elements of contributory
infringement or vicarious liability, it will be exempt from monetary liability if it satisfies
the criteria in subparagraphs (A) and (B).” 78
The House Report used the same examples of what does and does not constitute a
“financial benefit directly attributable to” infringing activity as contained in the Senate
Report. 79 Although the Senate and House reports did not compare its standard with
77
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vicarious infringement cases, we can undertake such a comparison here. According to
the Senate report, a flat fee charged and collected by an ISP from its users would not
constitute “receiv[ing] a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”
By contrast, under vicarious liability standards as applied by the Ninth Circuit in
Fonovisa, a flea market was found to have potentially received a “direct financial
benefit” based on general admission fees, concession fees, and parking fees that were
charged to any member of the public, regardless of whether they purchased bootlegged
recordings at the flea market. 80 Although these general fees charged to any member of
the public were enough for vicarious infringement, they would not be enough to
constitute a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” under the
DMCA, in my view. As the Senate Report indicates, “In general, a service provider
conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive a “financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity’ where the infringer makes the same kind of
payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service.”
4.

Other examples of how the DMCA safe harbors are “somewhat
more difficult to satisfy” than vicarious liability

One can easily find other examples where the DMCA’s requirement of a
“financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” is different from the
vicarious liability standard of financial benefit, and would produce a different outcome.
For example, in Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Association, Inc., 81 a horse race track hired an independent contractor to
provide music “[t]o entertain its patrons when they were not absorbed in watching the
races.” 82 Although the race track had not obtained an ASCAP license, it did instruct the
independent contractor “not to play any ASCAP copyrighted music.” 83 But, on two
different days, the independent contractor did so anyway. 84 The district court found the
horse track liable for the activities of the independent contractor, 85 and the First Circuit
affirmed. 86
However, under my reading of the DMCA safe harbors, even though the race
track was vicariously liable, the race track did not “receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity” based simply on patronage of the race track. There
was no evidence at all that patrons were paying admission fees or spending money at the
race track in order to listen to music of any kind, whether unauthorized or under license.
Presumably, people were paying the race track to make bets on the races! Therefore, the
race track’s revenues would not be “directly attributable to the infringing activity.”
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Similarly, in the old Supreme Court case Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 87 a
hotel was found liable for wiring in radio broadcasts into each room and allowing its
patrons to listen to the radio, which apparently included both authorized performances of
different songs and several unauthorized performances of the plaintiff’s song played by a
third-party radio station that selected the music. 88 These facts do not establish that the
hotel “receive[d] a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” of the
third-party radio station. The hotel earned no extra profit or fees from playing the radio,
which happened to include some unauthorized performances by the third party. In such
case, it would be purely speculative to say that the hotel even received an indirect
financial benefit from the radio station’s infringement, since it is not even clear that the
hotel guests were seeking the infringing music or even liked the particular song played.
By contrast, Napster presents a harder case. The music-file sharing service
Napster offered its services all for free. 89 Since no fees were involved or ever received
by Napster, one could plausibly argue that Napster never actually “receive[d] a financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” because Napster never actually
made any money from its users’ illegal activity. However, under vicarious infringement
standards, the district court found a financial benefit based on potential future revenues
from establishing a user-based comprised of users all looking for free, infringing music. 90
Napster had a “direct financial interest” in infringing music files because it acted as a
“draw” for users to Napster’s site. 91
Would this putative financial benefit be enough to satisfy the DMCA standard?
Perhaps, but only in an extreme set of facts like Napster. Although debatable, one could
argue, to borrow the Senate Report’s language, that the whole value of the Napster
service was “in providing access to infringing material” 92 since virtually all of its users
were purportedly sharing unauthorized files. Thus, to the extent that the Napster business
could be valued as a startup by accepted accounting methods and some portion of the
value directly attributed to Napster’s providing access to infringing activity, such proof
might well be enough to constitute a “financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity.” 93
Napster, though, is a pretty extreme case in which an entire business was
purportedly designed around illegal sharing of music, as evidenced by internal company
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documents. 94 Courts must be careful not to relax the DMCA standard of “receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” by allowing the Napster
court’s “financial draw” analysis to extend too far. A company’s development of a userbase should not be, in itself, evidence that the company “receive[d] a financial benefit
directly attributable to” any infringing activity that might have occurred on the site.
Otherwise, every single commercial website would fall outside of the DMCA safe
harbors.
II.

Decoding the “Red Flags” Theory of Liability

Another key issue regarding the DMCA safe harbors concerns the so-called “red
flags” theory. Beyond receiving a DMCA notice from a copyright holder, under what
circumstances must an ISP remove potentially infringing material in order to invoke the
DMCA safe harbor? The basic answer is easy to state: a duty arises if the ISP has either
actual knowledge of the infringing material on its site, or is “aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” 95 However, the difficulty lies
in determining the latter, “awareness of infringement” prong. Copyright holders have
argued that such awareness should be found to exist based on “red flags” created by the
existence of other infringing activity on a site. This Part explains why the few courts that
have considered the issue have correctly applied a very high standard of proof to satisfy
the “awareness of infringement” prong or establish the so-called “red flags” theory.
A.

Relevant Text of the DMCA safe harbor

Both the hosting safe harbor in § 512(c) and the safe harbor for information
location tools in § 512(d) contain several provisions dealing with the ISP’s knowledge of
infringing activity. Although the provision is quoted above, it is worth repeating it in full
here for convenience of the reader:
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.-(1) In general.--A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider, if the service provider-(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove,
94
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or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.

The same language in § 512(c)(1)(A) and (C) can be found in § 512(d)(1) and (3), which
sets forth the requirements for the safe harbor for activity involving location tools. 96
These “knowledge” subsections effectively qualify the knowledge element of
contributory infringement. Under contributory liability, a defendant can be liable if he
knew or had reason to know of another’s direct infringement and materially contributed
to it. 97 Under the DMCA safe harbor, however, knowledge of infringing activity and
material contribution are not dispositive; an ISP can possess knowledge of a third party’s
direct infringement, but still fall within the safe harbor by “act[ing] expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material.” 98
This is known as the DMCA “notice and take-down” procedure, which is the most
common way that alleged copyright infringements are resolved online. An ISP can be
found to possess the requisite knowledge activating the ISP’s duty to “take down”
material by the copyright holder’s submission of a DMCA notice of claimed infringement
to the ISP as set forth under the DMCA. 99
But the DMCA safe harbor also requires such takedown if the ISP has either (i)
actual knowledge of infringing material or (ii) “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent” as set forth in subsection (A). 100 It is this
latter, more nebulous section dealing with “awareness” that creates some uncertainty for
ISPs and copyright holders.
B.

When Is an ISP “Aware of Facts from Which Infringing Activity Is
Apparent”?

So when does an ISP have a sufficient level of “aware[ness] of facts from which
infringing activity is apparent,” thus giving rise to a duty to take down the material to fall
within the DMCA safe harbor? As with all knowledge-based questions, a lot will depend
on facts of each case. The Senate Judiciary Committee report indicates that
“aware[ness]” be judged both subjectively (the ISP’s actual state of mind) and
objectively, asking “whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable
96
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person operating under the same or similar circumstances.” 101
agrees. 102
1.

The House report

Plain Language

A close textual analysis provides some indication that Congress intended to
establish a very high standard of knowledge. The ISP must be “aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” It is not enough, in other
words, that the facts suggest potential or possible infringement. It is not enough that the
facts might raise a suspicion of infringement. There must be actual infringement
occurring and it must be “apparent” from the facts or circumstances.
Under a dictionary definition, “apparent” means “(1) readily seen; exposed to
sight; open to view; visible; (2) capable of being easily perceived or understood; plain or
clear; obvious.” 103 Thus, one is “aware of facts from which infringing activity is
apparent,” when it is “plain, clear, or obvious” from the facts that infringement is
occurring. 104 As discussed later below, the Committee reports confirm Congress’s intent
to require a high standard of knowledge.
2.

Structural analysis of the DMCA

The overall structure of the DMCA safe harbors also supports adopting a high
standard of awareness of “obvious” or “blatant” infringement.
First, the whole point of a safe harbor is to provide a clear path for members of
the public to avoid liability. In enacting the DMCA safe harbors, Congress hoped to
“provide[] greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for
infringements that may occur in the course of their activities.” 105 Requiring a high level
of proof to establish that an ISP was “aware of facts from which infringing activity is
apparent” serves the whole purpose of having a safe harbor. A low standard, however,
would invite constant litigation against Internet companies, given how easy it would be to
allege that they were “aware of facts from which infringing activity is apparent.” Every
website that has implemented the notice-and-takedown procedure of the DMCA probably
has run into problems of alleged copyright infringement, which then could be used as the
basis for an allegation that the ISP was “aware of facts from which infringing activity is
apparent.”
Second, the DMCA expressly states that an ISP does not have any affirmative
duty to “monitor[] its service or [to] affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing
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activity.” 106 This provision helps to ensure that ISPs can continue to rely on automated
systems that are commonplace on the Internet. Congress did not want to turn ISPs into
censors of material or to create perverse incentives for ISPs to remove indiscriminately
vast amounts of material for fear of copyright lawsuits. Congress realized that the
question of what constitutes copyright infringement is so often difficult, if not impossible,
to determine outside of court. Both the Senate and the House committee reports indicate
the DMCA was drafted so as to avoid imposing a duty on ISPs to “investigate possible
infringements, monitor its service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is
or is not infringing.” 107
Another key component of the DMCA is the notice-and-takedown procedure.
Congress chose to place some of the burden on copyright holders to provide notice of
claimed infringement and some of the burden on ISPs to take down such material, in a
spirit of cooperation. 108 Congress understood the value of the decentralized nature of
the Internet, particularly in allowing the widespread dissemination of speech. The noticeand-takedown process serves important First Amendment goals because it avoids the
specter of ISPs indiscriminately censoring speech due to fears of copyright lawsuits by
requiring copyright holders to indicate, under penalty of perjury, when and where they
believe their works have been infringed. 109 As the Ninth Circuit explained: “This
requirement is not superfluous. Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic
consequences: A user could have content removed, or may have his access terminated
entirely. If the content infringes, justice has been done. But if it does not, speech
protected under the First Amendment could be removed.” 110
Finally, § 512(j), the injunction provision in the DMCA, allows courts to enjoin,
under certain conditions, an ISP that falls within the safe harbor. 111 All of these
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conditions require great specificity in identifying the person engaging in infringing
activity or the particular location of the infringing material online.112 A broad injunction
to stop infringement occurring generally on a website would not pass muster. Congress
also specified four factors for courts to consider in issuing injunctions:
(A) whether such an injunction, either alone or in combination with other such
injunctions issued against the same service provider under this subsection, would
significantly burden either the provider or the operation of the provider’s system or
network;
(B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suffered by the copyright owner in the digital
network environment if steps are not taken to prevent or restrain the infringement;
(C) whether implementation of such an injunction would be technically feasible and
effective, and would not interfere with access to noninfringing material at other online
locations; and
(D) whether other less burdensome and comparably effective means of preventing or
restraining access to the infringing material are available. 113

Three of the four factors are concerned with not imposing significant or impracticable
burdens on ISPs to try to stamp out infringement online. These several provisions further
support requiring a high level of proof to establish an ISP is “aware of facts from which
infringing activity is apparent.”
3.

Legislative history: obvious infringement and “red flags”

The Senate and the House committee reports support this view. In order for
infringing activity to be “apparent,” it must be “obviously” or “clearly” infringing, such
as a well-known “pirate” site. The Reports explain this high standard in what is
sometimes called the “red flags” theory:
Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright
infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to
“red flags” of obvious infringement.
For instance, the copyright owner could show that the provider was aware of facts from
which infringing activity was apparent if the copyright owner could prove that the
location was clearly, at the time the directory provider viewed it, a “pirate” site of the
type described below, where sound recordings, software, movies or books were available
for unauthorized downloading, public performance or public display.* * *
The important intended objective of this standard is to exclude sophisticated “pirate”
directories—which refer Internet users to other selected Internet sites where pirate
software, books, movies, and music can be downloaded or transmitted-from the safe
harbor. Such pirate directories refer Internet users to sites that are obviously infringing
because they typically use words such as “pirate,” “bootleg,” or slang terms in their
uniform resource locator (URL) and header information to make their illegal purpose
obvious to the pirate directories and other Internet users. Because the infringing nature
112
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of such sites would be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, safe harbor status
for a provider that views such a site and then establishes a link to it would not be
appropriate. Pirate directories do not follow the routine business practices of legitimate
service providers preparing directories, and thus evidence that they have viewed the
infringing site may be all that is available for copyright owners to rebut their claim to a
safe harbor. 114

The Committee Reports explain the important policy reason for choosing a high
standard for “awareness of infringement.” The basic reason is that the whole question of
infringement is so often difficult to determine outside of court, so Congress did not want
to saddle Internet sites with the impossible burden of trying to differentiate what
constitutes copyright infringement in the myriad of situations on the Internet.
In this way, the “red flag” test in section 512(d) strikes the right balance. The commonsense result of this “red flag” test is that on-line editors and catalogers would not be
required to make discriminating judgments about potential copyright infringement. If,
however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may be all that is needed for
the service provider to encounter a “red flag.” A provider proceeding in the face of such a
red flag must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor. 115

The Nimmer treatise agrees with the soundness and sensibility of Congress’s approach. 116
Finally, a “red flag” cannot exist based merely on the fact that infringement
occurred in the past on the Internet service. As Jonathan Band has explained, the DMCA
contemplates that Internet service providers will have to face infringement on their sites,
and the DMCA safe harbors were never intended to allow only “one free pass” from
liability. 117
4.

Cases

Only a few courts so far have considered whether an ISP was “aware of facts and
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” under the so-called “red flags”
theory. All have applied a high standard of particularized knowledge, consistent with the
interpretation I have outlined above.
A leading case is Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 118 which involved a copyright lawsuit
brought by an adult magazine Perfect 10 against CWIE, a webhosting service, and
CCBill, an online payment service, that allegedly provided services to third-party
websites that had infringing photos of Perfect 10. 119 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
114
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plaintiff’s assertions that “red flags” of infringement existed based on the fact that the
defendants provided services to (i) two websites with domain names “illegal.net” and
“stolencelebritypics.com,” and (ii) several websites that allegedly provided services to
hack password security measures on other websites. 120 The court concluded that the facts
did not establish actual copyright infringement, much less defendants’ knowledge of it,
and there was no duty for ISPs to investigate further under the DMCA. 121 For example,
the domain names did not establish copyright infringement in themselves because the
domain names with “illegal” or “stolen” could “be an attempt to increase their salacious
appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.” 122
The court held that the DMCA did “not place the burden of determining whether
photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.” 123
Another key case is Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com. 124 Corbis was a distributor for
licensed photographs and art images taken by photographers who had contracts with
Corbis. 125 Over 230 copyrighted images were allegedly posted without Corbis’s
permission on third party websites hosted by Amazon under its “zShops” service, as well
as on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), which was owned by Amazon. 126 Instead of
sending a DMCA notice to Amazon, Corbis sued. 127 In holding that Amazon fell within
the DMCA safe harbor (for the majority of claims), the district court rejected Corbis’s
argument that Amazon had knowledge of “red flags” indicating infringement based on its
general awareness that infringement could be taking place on zShops sites. 128 Citing the
committee reports, the court held that Congress established a very high standard of
“blatant” or “obvious” infringement that is clear “from even a ‘brief and casual
viewing.’” 129
The court elaborated on when infringement may be clear or blatant. 130 “[I]t
requires, at a minimum, that a service provider who receives notice of a copyright
violation be able to tell merely from looking at the user’s activities, statements, or
conduct that copyright infringement is occurring.” 131 That inquiry, moreover, must be
tempered with possible fair use and other defenses that can be raised.132 In applying this
standard, the district court rejected Corbis’s argument that Amazon had knowledge of a
“red flag” based on its receipt of 10 total DMCA notices against two different vendors on
Amazon’s zShops sites that provided photographs that allegedly infringed the copyrights
of others. 133 The court explained:
120
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[T]here is no evidence suggesting that Amazon would have been able to tell, merely by
looking at the Famed & Framed and Posternow listings, that the posters and photos being
sold infringed another’s copyrights. Without some evidence from the site raising a red
flag, Amazon would not know enough about the photograph, the copyright owner, or the
user to make a determination that the vendor was engaging in blatant copyright
infringement. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, p. 30 (merely being aware of “one or more well
known photographs of a celebrity at a site” does not provide a service provider with
knowledge of possible infringement).

Finally, although the DMCA safe harbors do not apply to trademark law, the
recent trademark case of Tiffany v. eBay takes a very similar approach to answering the
question of what level of knowledge of infringing activity on a website such as eBay
must be present before the site has a duty to stop or correct the activity. 134 Just as in
copyright law, 135 contributory infringement under trademark law requires that the
defendant “know[s] or [has] reason to know” of the infringing activity. 136 The Tiffany
court ruled that eBay’s generalized knowledge that some infringing (third-party) activity
took place on eBay’s website was insufficient to satisfy the knowledge prong or to
impose an affirmative duty for eBay to address the general problem, apart from eBay’s
undisputed remedial efforts once it had knowledge of specific instances of
infringement. 137 In short, specific knowledge of a particular infringement—such as
“written notice of a specific infringing event, providing the date, the event, and the
location of the event”—is required before trademark law imposes a duty on the defendant
to monitor its website. 138 That an Internet site generally knows that conduct on its site
“might be” infringing is not enough to serve as the basis of knowledge of “specific
instances of actual infringement.” 139
C.

Applying the Awareness Standard to YouTube and MySpace

To understand the proper understanding of the awareness standard under §
512(c)(1)(A), let’s consider one common scenario from the video sharing context.
Today, people are able to upload videos onto YouTube, MySpace Video, and a host of
other sites. (Both YouTube and MySpace have been sued for copyright infringement
based on their users’ videos in several cases that are still ongoing. 140 )
What happens if an employee of YouTube or MySpace randomly notices, on their
respective sites, a thumb-nail image or screen shot of a video that contains the image of
Jerry Seinfeld with the header “Seinfeld”? Thumb-nail images or still “screen shots” of
videos are commonly used by video-sharing websites like YouTube and MySpace to give
a snapshot of what content each video contains. The screen shots are usually generated
134
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automatically from each video; some sites, like YouTube, allow the user to choose from
among several automatically-generated screen shots. Imagine in our hypothetical that the
screen shot of Jerry Seinfeld looks like a shot from his popular television show. Would
the Seinfeld screen shot be a “red flag”?
No. Under my reading of the DMCA, the employee’s mere knowledge of a Jerry
Seinfeld thumb-nail image or screen shot on the website would not constitute being
“aware of facts from which infringing activity is apparent.” It is neither plain, clear, nor
obvious that a mere screen shot of Jerry Seinfeld is copyright infringement. The problem
with applying the “red flags” theory here is that the color of the flag is unclear—it may
be pink, green, orange, white, or a variety of other colors.
Put simply, the copyright status of the Seinfeld video is unclear from the mere
image of the screenshot. True, the video clip could be an unauthorized copy of part of a
Seinfeld episode, or an unauthorized bootleg of a Jerry Seinfeld comedy routine
performed in Vegas. But it also could be just a single photograph of Seinfeld spliced into
a user-generated video, a random “teaser” thrown in the video to attract more views. It
also could be a legitimate copy used for fair use purposes, such as a parody of Seinfeld.
There’s also the possibility that the video clip could have been authorized by Jerry
Seinfeld himself or the Seinfeld copyright holder for posting. In other words,
infringement is not “apparent”—clear, plain, or obvious—from merely viewing the
screen shot of Jerry Seinfeld, the title, and the username of the person who posted it. The
DMCA does not obligate the ISP to “affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing
activity,” so the ISP would be under no duty to investigate further. 141
The scenario is similar to the one discussed in Corbis, in which the court rejected
the notion that the photographs on a site provided a “red flag” of infringement. Also, the
Senate and House reports both point to an analogous situation in which they found no
obvious infringement:
Absent such “red flags” or actual knowledge, a directory provider would not be similarly
aware merely because it saw one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site
devoted to that person. The provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
cataloguing visit, to determine whether the photograph was still protected by copyright or
was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by copyright, whether the
use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair
use doctrine. 142

The same predicament befalls the YouTube or MySpace employee in the Seinfeld
scenario. Although imposing a duty for ISPs to look at just one Seinfeld video does not
seem like much, hundreds of thousands of videos are uploaded each day on YouTube
alone. 143 Requiring an ISP to review every video based on screen shots that could
suggest infringement (or not) would effectively gut § 512(m)’s clear proscription against
imposing a duty to monitor on ISPs.
141
142
143
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III.

Rebooting the DMCA Safe Harbors for the Future

In the ten years following the DMCA’s enactment, courts have decided less than
twenty-five cases involving the DMCA safe harbors (some of which did not even render
a final decision on the merits of the DMCA defense). 144 The relative lack of litigation is
both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because Internet companies and web
applications of all kinds have flourished, with a tremendous growth of user-generated
content and speech activities online. As Professor Tim Wu aptly put it, the DMCA safe
harbors are “the Magna Carta for Web 2.0.” 145 No one can deny the tremendous success
over the past decade in achieving the central goal of the DMCA safe harbors—“by
limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the
Internet will continue to expand.” 146 The DMCA “facilitate[s] the robust development
and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research,
development, and education in the digital age.” 147 The Internet of 2009 is light years
beyond the Internet of 1998.
But the lack of litigation is also a curse because it allows ambiguities on
seemingly basic issues about the scope of protection under the DMCA safe harbors to
persist for long periods of time, and in a way that exposes Internet companies to
144
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potentially unjustified threats of copyright lawsuits. Uncertainty defeats the whole
purpose of a safe harbor because companies are unable to identify the necessary steps to
avoid liability. Parts I and II above have attempted to clear up two of the key ambiguities
of the DMCA safe harbors. But these ambiguities, along with others, will persist until
courts clarify them. And, unfortunately, we can expect other ambiguities to arise, given
the way in which the technologies of the Internet rapidly develop and change. This final
Part provides more general guidance and a set of principles for both courts and Congress
on how the DMCA safe harbors can be made safe and workable in today’s Internet age.
A.

Principles for Making the DMCA Safe Harbors Safe

I offer several principles and proposals that can help the DMCA safe harbors
work more efficiently, i.e., to make them truly “safe” harbors.
1.

Loophole theories of the DMCA should be disfavored

First, in interpreting the DMCA safe harbors, courts should disfavor
interpretations that create loopholes. Where the DMCA safe harbors are ambiguous,
courts should disfavor an interpretation that threatens to create a loophole or otherwise
severely undermine the whole concept of a safe harbor. Where a reasonable alternative
interpretation exists, the court should adopt the interpretation that protects the integrity of
the safe harbor instead of creating a loophole.
Part I applied such an approach in dissecting the relationship between vicarious
liability and the DMCA safe harbors. Just as courts have already interpreted the
DMCA’s requirement of a “right and ability to control such [infringing] activity” more
narrowly than the analogous requirement for vicarious liability, courts should also
interpret the DMCA’s requirement of “a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity” as requiring greater attribution than the simple “direct financial
benefit” requirement under the common law. Otherwise, the DMCA safe harbors would
contain a gaping loophole for vicarious liability, leaving all Internet companies exposed
to potentially limitless liability. Every single commercial Internet company on the
Internet that deals with content of third parties—from AOL to Google to MySpace to
Yahoo!—would be at serious risk of vicarious liability.
To their credit, an increasing number of courts have begun to apply this
interpretive principle against loopholes in the DMCA. For example, the Hendrickson v.
eBay court’s narrow interpretation of “right and ability to control” was adopted to avoid
“defeat[ing] the purpose of the DMCA and render[ing] the statute internally
inconsistent.” 148 As the court recognized, “Congress could not have intended for courts
to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the DMCA.” 149
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Likewise, in the recent video website case UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., the district court rejected a similar attempt to read § 512(c)’s safe harbor
so narrowly that it would protect only an Internet company’s mere storage of “material at
the direction of the user,” but not if anyone later accessed or displayed the stored material
on the Internet. 150 Plaintiff Universal Music Group’s interpretation, if adopted, would
have rendered the § 512(c) safe harbor a complete nullity. Virtually all Internet
companies that are in the business of hosting third-party content—ranging from website
hosting companies such as Godaddy to content companies such as MySpace, Facebook,
or YouTube—host third-party content so the content can be shared with others on the
Internet. 151 After all, the Internet is a huge network for dissemination of content.
In rejecting Universal Music’s argument, Judge Matz adopted the reading of §
512(c) that would not eviscerate it. The text of § 512(c) says that “[a] service provider
shall not be liable for monetary relief by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider….” 152 According to Matz, “by reason of” meant “as a result of” or “attributable
to.” 153 “So understood, when copyrighted content is displayed or distributed on Veoh it
is ‘as a result of’ or ‘attributable to’ the fact that users uploaded the content to Veoh’s
servers to be accessed by other means.” 154 Judge Matz fortified his textual analysis with
several very persuasive passages rejecting Universal Music’s loophole reading; for
example, Matz reasoned:
If providing access could trigger liability without the possibility of DMCA immunity,
service providers would be greatly deterred from performing their basic, vital and
155
salutary function-namely, providing access to information and material for the public.
150
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Judge Matz’s opinion is a perfect example of how to apply the principle against reading
loopholes into the DMCA.
2.

The need for certainty and clarity in the DMCA safe harbors

Second, the DMCA safe harbors should be interpreted or clarified in a way to
promote certainty and clarity for private planning. Both the courts in construing the
DMCA and Congress in possibly updating it should consider the need for certainty and
clarity in the DMCA safe harbors in order for them to be at all effective. An uncertain or
unclear “safe harbor” is self-defeating and of no practical use because it cannot guide
people on how to act to avoid liability. 156 Even worse, an uncertain or unclear safe
harbor can act as a “trap” for even the wary by dangling the false prospect of immunity
from liability to businesses that invest millions of dollars based on the unclear law trying
to follow what appears to be a safe harbor. As Jude Matz noted in the UMG Recordings
case, “[t]he ‘safe harbor’ would in fact be full of treacherous shoals,” 157 defeating the
whole purpose of a safe harbor.
Because so few cases involving the DMCA safe harbor are ever litigated, courts
should be mindful in those cases of the need to articulate clearly the specific steps
Internet service providers can take to fall within the safe harbor. Of course, the statute is
supposed to set forth these requirements. By enacting a safe harbor, Congress hoped for
clarity to foster investment in Internet services. 158
But clarity is easier said than done. To the extent the statutory requirements are
ambiguous as applied to particular set of facts, courts should attempt to provide clear
guidance to the public on how the requirements can be met, bearing in mind the
presumption against creating loopholes.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case involving the DMCA safe
harbors, it has provided an opinion in a different context, a Title VII employment case,
that can serve as a model to follow. In Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court set
forth a safe harbor or affirmative defense under Title VII for employers against vicarious
liability: “The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
156

See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1314-16
(2002) (discussing how rules promote predictability and private planning); id. at 1348-56 (discussing rule
approach to CDA safe harbor); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors,
93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1502-03, 1510-11 (2007) (discussing benefits of crafting clear and certain safe harbor
rules); id. at 1511 (“Consistent with the above observations, our proposed safe harbors seek to eliminate
uncertainty wherever possible.”).
157
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2008 WL 5423841, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (emphasis added).
158
S. Rep. 105-190, at 8 (“without clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to
make the necessary investment in the expansion and speed and capacity of the Internet”); id. at 20 (Title II
“provides greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may
occur in the course of their activities”).

36

behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” 159 The Court elaborated:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee
failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not
limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by
the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense. No affirmative defense is
available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 160

The Court adopted this safe harbor for employers under Title VII “[i]n order to
accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of
supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic policies of encouraging
forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees.” 161
Although Title VII’s regulation of the employment setting is pretty different from
the DMCA’s regulation of Internet activities (and I do not want to stretch the analogy
here), 162 some of the general lessons already learned under Title VII are instructive for
the more recently enacted DMCA. Like Title VII, the DMCA deals with difficult issues
of secondary liability in contexts where primary or direct liability can be expected to
recur. Both statutes attempt to encourage forethought and remedial action on part of
those entities that can potentially face repeated lawsuits for secondary liability based on
the conduct of others. Just as the Ellerth Court interpreted Title VII to establish a safe
harbor for employers that set up and implement an antiharassment policy with complaint
procedure for employees, the DMCA establishes a safe harbor for Internet service
providers that reasonably implement a “repeat infringer” policy with a complaint
procedure for notice-and-takedown. 163
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3.

The need for updating the DMCA

The relative lack of litigation over the DMCA safe harbors in the past 10 years
suggests that Congress should itself periodically review the DMCA safe harbors,
particularly as new web applications and technologies continue to develop at almost
dizzying speed. Congress should consider granting the Librarian of Congress (or a
designated agency) the rulemaking authority to establish new safe harbors for ISPs
through administrative proceedings. Such a provision already exists in Title I of the
DMCA granting the Librarian the power and the responsibility to recognize temporary
exceptions to the anticircumvention provision. 164 The Title I provision requires the
Librarian to consider, every three years, possible exceptions “upon the recommendation
of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce.” 165 This rulemaking
process for exceptions was intended to accommodate “persons who are users of
copyrighted work [who] are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely
affected” by the anticircumvention provision.166
My proposal has one key difference from Title I’s rulemaking procedure.
Because entire Internet businesses can be constructed to meet the DMCA safe harbors,
with millions of dollars invested, any future safe harbors recognized in the proposed
rulemaking process should be permanent, not temporary. It would be unreasonable to
expect an Internet company to expend millions of dollars to conduct a business that falls
within a safe harbor, only to have that safe harbor disappear.
B.

Principles for Making the Internet Work

The next set of principles relate to the fact that the DMCA safe harbors regulate
the Internet, a speech technology. Amidst the all the statutory complexity, it may be easy
to forget that the DMCA deals with the Internet. As Congress itself noted in committee
reports, the statute should not be applied in way to retard the development of this network
and revolutionary technology that has such considerable importance for First Amendment
activities. 167 Efforts to combat copyright infringement must be balanced with the need to
avoid restricting or retarding the Internet. Accordingly, where the text allows, courts
should interpret the DMCA safe harbors in a way that avoids seriously undermining the
Internet’s development. I offer two principles to serve that end.
1.

Automated features and industry standards

First, courts should be wary of arguments that rely on imputing liability based on
mere automated features of the Internet or websites, or features that have become
industry wide standards or that enable interoperability. Copyright holders have routinely
164
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attempted to hold companies liable for mere automated systems that deal with third-party
content or transmissions. Often, copyright holders seek to require Internet companies to
engage in individual human review of content or links instead of using an automated
system. As discussed above, the so-called “red flags” theory can easily devolve into such
a request. Courts should be skeptical of these sorts of arguments.
Congress understood that the DMCA safe harbors were needed to protect Internet
services from limitless liability that could be imposed on such services based simply on
how the Internet must function to handle vast amounts of material throughout the
network. As the Senate Report explained:
In the ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in all kinds of
acts that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability. For example, service
providers must make innumerable electronic copies by simply transmitting information
over the Internet. Certain electronic copies are made to speed up the delivery of
information to users. Other providers engage in directing users to sites in response to
inquiries by users or they volunteer sites that users may find attractive. Some of these
sites might contain infringing material. In short, by limiting the liability of service
providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve
168
and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to expand.

Moreover, in the context of describing the safe harbor for passive conduits in subsection
(a), the House Report indicated that automated processes should not be interpreted to
disqualify an Internet service provider as a passive conduct, rejecting the theory that an
automated process meant that the ISP was the one that actually “select[ed] … the
material” sent through its automated service by users. 169
Even before the DMCA was enacted, courts recognized serious problems with
arguments against using automated features of the Internet. For example, Judge Whyte in
Netcom rejected a claim of direct liability against a bulletin board operator that allowed
third parties to post messages on its system. 170 Judge Whyte analogized Netcom’s
“designing or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly creates temporary
copies of all data sent through it” to the designing of “a copying machine [that] lets the
public make copies with it.” 171 The court rejected an interpretation of the Copyright Act
that would make liable “every single Usenet server in the worldwide link of computers
transmitting [the plaintiff’s] message to every other computer.” 172 In order for direct
liability to attach, the Copyright Act requires an act of copying of greater “volition” by
defendant than merely setting up an automated system on the Internet. 173 In addition,
Judge Whyte recognized the likely chilling of speech that could arise if Internet
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intermediaries had to prescreen by human inspection every piece of content or
information posted by users. 174
The House Report to the DMCA endorsed the Netcom approach. 175 The wisdom
of Judge Whyte’s decision is that it recognizes that the Internet, which is a vast
worldwide network of communication channels, depends on the ability to handle vast
amounts of content in an automated system. No one “runs” the Internet. At least in free
societies, no one prescreens who can post what. Thankfully, we do not have to wait for
permission or human review to send an email or upload a photo.
Indeed, many of the most used and useful web applications on the Internet are
offered to the public, often without charge, through intermediaries, or, in the terminology
of the DMCA, Internet service providers. These intermediaries are able to service the
huge demands of the public only because the intermediaries set up automated
technological systems that can scale to enormous proportions. As Lemley aptly noted,
“Internet intermediaries—service providers, Web hosting companies, Internet backbone
providers, online marketplaces, and search engines—process hundreds of millions of data
transfers every day, and host or link to literally tens of billions of items of third party
content. They can process and host that data instantaneously only because they automate
the process.” 176 The danger in the copyright holders’ argument against automated
systems is that, if accepted, it would threaten to put intermediaries out of business, or to
force them to dismantle their automated features that are so basic to Internet usage.
Take, for example, Universal Music’s case against the video-sharing site Veoh.
Universal argued that Veoh did not fall within the DMCA safe harbor for storing videos
of its users because Veoh had set up an automated system that (i) converted each video
into a common Flash file format to make them easier to watch on any video player and
also (ii) “chunked” some of the videos into smaller chunks of the original file in order to
make them more manageable. 177 Universal’s theory was that the storage of the Flashformatted files and the chunked files on Veoh’s system was done “at the direction of”
Veoh, and not Veoh’s user as required to fall within the safe harbor. 178 In other words,
even though the videos were originally uploaded onto Veoh’s system at the direction of
Veoh users, Universal argued that Veoh’s automated conversion of those videos into an
easier format and size to view on the Internet meant that the videos were no longer stored
at the direction of the Veoh users, but were instead stored at the direction of Veoh (by
means of its automated system).
Canvassing the case law, Judge Matz rejected Universal’s argument. Judge Matz
cited approvingly to Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc, in which the Northern District
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of California rejected the exact same argument about the automated conversion into Flash
format of video files. 179 In Io Group, the district court noted that, unlike the definition of
service providers that act as passive conduits for Internet transmissions under § 512(a), 180
the definition for service providers for the § 512(c) safe harbor did not contain a
restriction that the service provider cannot modify the content of the user material. 181
Moreover, Veoh’s automated conversion process did not change the basic fact that the
video file was uploaded by a user. Without the user, there would be no video on Veoh’s
system. “Veoh has simply established a system whereby software automatically
processes user-submitted content and recasts it in a format that is readily accessible to its
users.” 182 Agreeing with Io Group, the UMG Recordings court ruled that Veoh’s
automated conversion affected “only the form and not the content of the movies”
uploaded by users. 183
Both of these decisions do a great job in attempting to interpret the DMCA safe
harbors in a way that makes the Internet workable. As discussed above, automated
systems are necessary for intermediaries to handle the unbelievable amounts of data and
content that are transmitted over the Internet. Although not discussed in these two cases
against Veoh, the vast majority of videos on the Internet are converted into Flash format,
which today is the industry standard. 184 YouTube, the first company to solve the
difficulty of watching videos online, chose the Flash format because it provided a
universal format that could easily be played on most video players and also embedded on
other sites, all while providing a more instantaneous viewing (without annoying lags in
time for buffering). 185
Put more starkly, if Universal Music’s argument were accepted, the entire online
video sharing industry today would have to shut down. This is no exaggeration. Because
YouTube and most other video sharing services (such as blip.tv, Dailymotion, Veoh,
Yahoo!) use an automated system of Flash-formatted conversion of user-submitted
videos, they would all fall outside the DMCA safe harbors under Universal Music’s
argument. In other words, all these companies would be exposed to massive copyright
179
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liability. If these companies chose to abandon the Flash format for videos, it would
cripple the ability of people to share and watch videos online. Without Flash, the Internet
would be back to the days before YouTube, circa 2004, when no one had solved the
problem of how to allow everyone to upload and watch videos online.
The thought of returning the Internet to the state of 2004 should give any court
serious pause. Flash-formatted videos are what allowed President Barack Obama and the
other presidential candidates to reach millions of voters and others around the world
through YouTube and other sites, all for free. By Election Day, Obama had 94.5 million
views collectively of over 1,800 videos Obama posted on YouTube. 186 During the
transition, Obama started to post videos of his weekly address on YouTube, 187 a practice
that put the presidency (and the radio address) firmly into the Internet Age. For his
Inauguration, Obama posted videos as well. 188 And, once in office, Pres. Obama opened
up a White House channel on YouTube with videos from his presidency. 189 All of these
videos are Flash-formatted. All were uploaded “at the direction of” Pres. Obama.
YouTube and other video-sharing services should not lose their protection under the
DMCA safe harbor just because they set up an automated system that enables any
individual, from Pres. Obama to the person on the street, to share a video in a universal
format that increases the potential audience of the video.
2.

Freedom of the press and fostering technological innovation

Finally, there is the Free Press Clause. Elsewhere, I have written extensively
about how the Framers understood the Free Press Clause as a direct limit on the
Copyright Clause. 190 One of the core abuses that the Framers sought to end was the
restriction of speech technologies, such as limits on the number and ownership of printing
presses during 16th century England, as a way to protect copyrights. 191 The Free Press
Clause was meant to prohibit Congress from using copyright law to restrict speech
technologies. 192 Just as the Framers were wary of government depriving the people of
arms, so too the Framers feared that government might deprive the people of the printing
press. 193
To be faithful to the Free Press Clause, courts should interpret the DMCA safe
harbor, where possible, in a way to avoid First Amendment problems. 194 Because the
DMCA safe harbors regulate Internet services that facilitate the widescale dissemination
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of speech by the public, courts must avoid letting copyright law restrict or prohibit speech
technologies. In addition, because the DMCA safe harbors operate as First Amendment
safeguards within copyright law—promoting the development of speech technologies on
the Internet—“it is appropriate to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to
accommodate First Amendment concerns.” 195
For far too long, courts and commentators have ignored this core protection of the
Free Press Clause. 196 In the past, this oversight was perhaps understandable, given that
the traditional contours of copyright law dating back to the First Copyright Act did not
ever attempt to regulate speech technologies. 197 But that all changed beginning in the
late 20th century when copyright holders sought to hold technology developers liable
based on the conduct of users of their technology. In 1984, the Supreme Court
established the Sony safe harbor that provides technology developers immunity from
liability for developing a technology that is “capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.” 198 In Sony, the Court held that Sony, the developer of the betamax or video
recorder, could not be held liable for making a technology that was capable of copying
for fair use purposes. 199 In prior scholarship, I have argued that the Sony safe harbor
operates as a traditional First Amendment safeguard 200 within copyright law to serve Free
Press interests and the development of speech technologies.201
For similar reasons, the DMCA safe harbors act as important First Amendment
safeguards within copyright law for the Internet. There can be no doubt that the Internet
receives full First Amendment protection.202 Indeed, the Supreme Court made special
note of how the amazing functions and technologies of the Internet can enable any person
to be a publisher to a potential audience of millions. 203 As the Court put it in 1997,
“[t]his dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional
print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive,
real-time dialogue.” 204 The DMCA was enacted to foster the development of these
revolutionary technologies, and to “ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet will
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continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will
expand.” 205
The DMCA safe harbors thus provide an important First Amendment safeguard
for web technologies. Although copyright law can proscribe infringement on the
Internet, copyright law cannot prohibit Internet technologies that are capable of
substantial noninfringing uses under the Sony safe harbor. 206 The DMCA safe harbors
provide an additional layer of regulation and immunity for Internet services that have
ongoing relationships with their users. These services are required to help in reducing the
infringement of their users by adopting repeat infringer policies and notice-and-takedown
procedures under the DMCA. 207 If they do, the DMCA safe harbors offer the web
services immunity from copyright liability. In the end, such protection fosters the
development of speech technologies on the Internet, which in turn fosters the creation and
sharing of speech by millions of people around the world.
Conclusion
The DMCA is a decade old, which, in Internet time, may well be closer to a
century. Although the DMCA safe harbors have helped to foster tremendous growth in
web applications, several very basic aspects of the DMCA safe harbors remain uncertain.
This Essay has attempted to clear up two of the biggest uncertainties regarding the
DMCA’s relationship to vicarious liability, and the so-called “red flags” theory. Of
course, it is up to the courts and Congress to provide the necessary clarity to these and
other issues in the future. This Essay offers five principles for courts and Congress to
consider in applying or amending the DMCA safe harbors in the future. The DMCA safe
harbors should be made truly “safe” harbors, in a way that encourages greater investment
in and the development of speech technologies on the Internet.
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